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first far-right party to join the Bundestag in nearly seventy years. Yet, it was not 
the first time that a challenger party entered the parliament to the chagrin of 
the political establishment. After introducing the AfD, the bhe, the Greens, and 
the Party of Democratic Socialism (pds), the article analyzes how established 
parties treated the newcomers and why they did so. This comparative perspec-
tive offers insights into the AfD’s challenge, how distinctive the policies toward 
the AfD have been, and why the established parties have dealt with the AfD 
as they have.
Keywords: Alternative for Germany (AfD), bhe, challenger parties, Greens, 
Party of Democratic Socialism (pds), populist parties
In September 2017, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) became the first 
far-right party to join the Bundestag in nearly seventy years. Against the 
backdrop of Germany’s Nazi past, the AfD’s advance has been troubling for 
Germany’s established parties, which face difficult choices on how to respond 
to this unwelcome newcomer.1 Scholars have fruitfully explored how main-
stream European parties have responded to new challenger parties. This 
article extends this comparative lens to postwar German cases. After all, it is 
not the first time that a challenger party joined the Bundestag to the chagrin 
of the political establishment. 
In 1953, a refugee party—Bloc of Expellees and Those Deprived of 
Rights (bhe) entered the Bundestag after securing 5.9 percent of the vote. 
It contained those favoring a pragmatic approach to improving the lives of 
German expellees from the east and others who tended toward rightwing 
extremism with the goal of recovering the lands of those forcibly displaced. 
Three decades later, the West German Greens joined the Bundestag after 
winning 5.6 percent in national elections. Arising from the social movements 
of the 1970s, they saw themselves as an alternative to the establishment and 
called for sweeping reforms, such as West Germany’s unilateral disarmament 
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and neutrality in place of nato membership, positions that struck many dur-
ing the Cold War as dangerous. Seven years later, the Party of Democratic 
Socialism (pds), which was the successor to the discredited Communist party 
of East Germany (sed), entered the Bundestag where it criticized unifica-
tion, called for democratic socialism, and stood by fallen East German elites. 
The party contained a radical-leftwing association that called itself the Com-
munist Platform (kpf) whose leader, Sahra Wagenknecht, had notoriously 
defended aspects of Stalinism.2
After introducing the four parties, the article presents a framework that 
distinguishes between approaches that focus on the supply of challenger par-
ties and those that address the demand for these parties. It compares how 
the other parties treated the newcomers and considers why they did so. This 
comparative perspective offers insights into the challenge posed by the AfD, 
how distinctive the policies toward the AfD have been, and why the estab-
lished parties have dealt with the AfD as they have. 
Four Challenger Parties
AfD
In national elections held on 24 September 2017, the AfD won 12.6 percent 
of the second ballot vote, enough for ninety-four seats in the Bundestag. 
Although two deputies promptly left the party, a third followed in late 2018, 
another in late 2019, and a fifth had quit by early 2020, its caucus remains 
the third largest in parliament. The AfD is typical of new challenger parties 
in that it highlights issues that the established parties have neglected,3 run-
ning on an election platform that featured anti-Islam, anti-immigration, and 
euroskeptical positions. The party presented itself in its program as a force for 
the “self-preservation” of the German ethnic nation: “We want to leave our 
descendants a country that is still recognizable as our Germany.”4 It called for 
closing Germany’s borders, limiting asylum rights, and “minus immigration.”5 
Unlike the Socialist Reich Party (srp), which was banned in 1952, or the 
National Democratic Party (npd), the AfD is less easily categorized as right-
wing extremist. Scholars and journalists typically characterize it as rightwing 
populist, while the party describes itself as bourgeois (bürgerlich), liberal, and 
conservative. A recent study makes the case that the AfD is a less extreme ver-
sion of a rightwing extremist party, like the Republikaner of the late 1980s.6 
Although its centrist wing has lost influence since 2013, the party contains a 
relatively moderate faction, the “Alternative Center;” it continues to promote 
traditional social conservativism and market liberalism; and has many former 
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Christian Democratic Union (cdu), Free Democratic Party (fdp), and Social 
Democratic Party (spd) members in its ranks. Of its ninety-four original Bund-
estag deputies, twenty-seven had pasts in the cdu/csu, eleven in the fdp, and 
ten in the spd. Eleven AfD deputies had been members of right-wing fringe 
parties.7 To the political scientist Werner Patzelt, the AfD filled party-system 
space vacated by the cdu: “For example, the Union was able to bind to it 
many of those whom they have lost by now to the AfD—and indeed to the AfD 
as a party, which on all kinds of positions has exactly copied that cdu, which 
no longer exists as the original.”8 In 2017, the AfD’s Bundestag caucus housed 
approximately twenty politicians who in the past had articulated scandalous 
positions regarding immigrants, Islam, National Socialism and the Holocaust—
or who had ties to far-right groups, such as the identitarian movement, Pegida, 
or the AfD’s ethnic nationalist “Wing” (Flügel), whose most prominent mem-
ber was Björn Höcke, the far-right nationalist leader of the AfD’s regional 
branch in Thuringia.9 
The AfD’s leadership honed an anti-immigrant, euroskeptical message in 
which the party, typical of rightwing populist parties, claimed to represent 
the common people vis-à-vis an allegedly corrupt and out-of-touch elite. To 
the AfD, the so-called “old parties,” also scorned as “cartel parties,” were 
part and parcel of a pervasive, left-liberal elite consensus that ran roughshod 
over the average German’s interests and values. As a protest party, it posted 
to the internet photos of poorly attended Bundestag plenary sessions to high-
light absenteeism. One of  its Bundestag deputies  tweeted a photo of a bal-
lot, with Chancellor Angela Merkel’s name on it, placed on a toilet.10 In the 
name of supposedly “telling it like it is,” the party made use of offensive, 
racially charged language and imagery. Bundestag caucus co-chair Alexander 
Gauland insulted the African-German soccer star Jerome Boateng on Twitter, 
spoke at a campaign rally of the “waste disposal (Entsorgung) in Anatolia” of 
Aydan Özoguz, the federal government’s integration commissioner, and trivi-
alized Hitler and the Nazis as “only bird droppings in our more than 1000-
year successful history.”11 In May 2018, caucus co-chair Alice Weidel received 
a rebuke from Bundestag president Wolfgang Schäuble after declaring that 
“Burkas, headscarf girls and state-supported (alimentierte) knife men and other 
good-for-nothings will not secure our prosperity, economic growth and above 
all the welfare state.”12 In the committees, away from the public eye, some 
AfD deputies have shown an aptitude for parliamentary work, while others 
have contributed little. In the Europe Committee, the AfD has slowed down 
the committee’s work.13
Upon joining the Bundestag, the AfD proceeded to nominate Albrecht Gla-
ser as its candidate for the Bundestag vice-president post. He had controversially 
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asserted that because Islam, when a state religion, does not allegedly protect 
religious freedom, then Islam should not be accorded the constitutionally pro-
tected freedom of religion (Religionsfreiheit)—a view rejected by other Bundes-
tag parties.14 The AfD unsuccessfully put Glaser up for a vote three times. 
It also nominated other polarizing candidates, none of whom came from its 
more moderate wing, to chair Bundestag committees. Peter Boehringer, who 
in an e-mail had referred to the chancellor as “Merkel-whore,” was proposed 
as the budget committee head; close to the “Wing,” Stephan Brandner was 
put forward as chair of the legal affairs committee; Sebastian Münzenmaier, 
accused of taking part in an attack by far-right hooligans, was nominated to 
chair the tourism committee.15 
Early on, the AfD stirred the pot by introducing motions that would have 
had the federal government reject key European Central Bank policies, return 
refugees to war-torn Syria, reinstate border controls while turning away those 
trying to enter the country improperly, and ban the burka.16 Regularly, the 
party found ways of incorporating its opposition to migration and refugees into 
discussions of other seemingly unrelated topics.17 Its provocative initiatives, as 
well as coarse language, heckling, and insults, contributed to a combative 
give-and-take among the parties in parliament.18 Its populism and discourse 
of victimhood left the others facing a conundrum: treat the party as a normal 
competitor although it often did not act as such or attack it and marginalize it 
at the risk of undergirding the AfD’s own narrative that the party was defend-
ing itself (and the German people) against vindictive political elites. To Anna 
Sauerbrey, the AfD follows a three-part strategy: first, cast itself as a normal, 
democratic competitor; second, provoke others in the Bundestag; and, third, 
declare itself a victim of the establishment.19 During a March 2020 Bundestag 
debate on rightwing terrorism, for example, Roland Hartwig (AfD) addressed 
the other parties that were condemning the AfD, and in particular Höcke, for 
having helped foster a racist climate in which the February 2020 bloodbath in 
Hanau occurred: “It is so nice, isn’t it, when one has a common enemy and is 
also in agreement on where to look: the right, namely.20
The newspaper die Süddeutsche Zeitung chronicled how the AfD changed 
the Bundestag during its first six months in the assembly. Its caucus frequently 
employed derisive laughter, done in chorus, to show contempt for the other 
parties. The stenographer recorded laughter by the AfD 156 times (directed 
at the cdu sixty-eight times), while no other caucus laughed more than sixty 
times. The newspaper’s investigation further revealed that the AfD was much 
less inclined than others to applaud speakers in other caucuses, and, when it 
did applaud, it tended to do so as a bloc, just as it often entered the chamber 
as a unit. The AfD made interruptions (Zwischenrufe) second only in number 
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to that of the Greens. It also used language reminiscent of the Third Reich, 
such as “degenerate” (entartet) or “racial” (völkisch), while challenging long 
accepted norms on how Germany dealt with the Nazi era.21 Another study 
revealed that the AfD made very frequent use of question asking (Zwischen-
fragen) during the first forty sessions of parliament. As part of its “opposition 
against everyone” strategy, the AfD posed seventy-six questions to speakers 
from the governing parties and forty-five questions to speakers of the other 
opposition parties. When speakers did not take the question, AfD deputies 
would often jeer. In contrast, the cdu/csu and spd questioned AfD speakers 
twenty-two times, whereas the other opposition parties only posed questions 
to the AfD speaker twenty-nine times, nearly half of the time coming from 
the Greens.22
bhe
The western occupying powers initially refused to license a refugee party 
given their concerns, shared by the allied-approved parties, that the expellees’ 
terrible plight would fan the flames of political extremism and revanchism. 
After forming in 1950, the bhe (later renamed gb/bhe) was an ideologically 
diverse party that avoided simple classification. As an outsider, it cast itself 
as the champion of victimized Germans ignored by an unresponsive political 
establishment. Unlike the AfD, however, it strove to join governments and 
refrained from protest in parliament. It voiced two central expellee demands: 
social rights in the west (Sozialrecht im Westen) and the right to return to lost 
homelands in the east (Heimatrecht im Osten) that reflected a reformist domes-
tic policy and a revisionist foreign policy that contained within it a national-
ist, extremist critique of the Federal Republic.23 In demanding social rights 
for expellees, the bhe warned that its largely destitute base might radicalize. 
In early 1950, the party reportedly encouraged its supporters to heckle and 
disrupt a political event.24 
A fierce critic of denazification policies, the bhe, which may have had 
the most ex-Nazi functionaries as party officials, helped overcome the post-
war blockade against former Nazi office holders entering politics.25 Its first 
national chair, Waldemar Kraft, had been an honorary captain in the ss. 
Its  second party  leader, Theodor Oberländer,  had participated  in Hitler’s 
1923 beer hall putsch and faced accusations of having committed war crimes. 
Although not extremist as a whole, the bhe served as a “political home for 
rightwing extremists and a contact partner to rightwing extremist parties, 
especially after the mid-1950s.”26
Like the AfD, the bhe presented itself as the champion of those ignored 
and neglected. In a 1952 speech, Kraft cautioned that “the representatives of 
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the state today are the losers of 1933, whom we can no longer believe will 
master the difficult tasks that lie before us. Therefore, we are the last hope of 
millions.”27 (Sixty-five years later, the AfD’s Björn Höcke would ominously 
warn: “The AfD is the last evolutionary, it is the last peaceful chance for our 
fatherland.”)28 The bhe attacked the established parties as “licensed” or “old,” 
and cast itself as the advocate of those who had paid the heaviest price for 
the lost war.
Greens
Formed in 1980, the Greens initially contained a right wing, centered around 
Herbert Gruhl who soon left the party, a center-left, often drawn from new 
social movement activists, and a left wing that included ecosocialists as well as 
Maoists coming from far-left communist splinter groups. Because the Greens 
accepted this latter element, thereby running afoul of the Federal Republic’s 
prevalent anticommunism, they faced accusations that they had been sub-
verted by extremists.29 Among its twenty-eight-person Bundestag caucus in 
1983, Gerd Bastian had been in the csu; Stefan Schulte in the fdp; Jürgen 
Reents in the Communist Federation (kb) and Will Hoss had been a mem-
ber of the German Communist Party.30 The party had a sizable radical wing 
(Fundis) that called for fundamental opposition to the political and economic 
status quo. It featured lawyers that had represented terrorists from the far-
left Red Army Faction (raf). In 1985, two members of the Green executive 
committee controversially pursued a dialogue with imprisoned raf terrorists, 
which aroused concerns about the party’s stance on political violence.31 
In their federal election manifesto in 1983, the Greens opened with a call 
for dramatic change: “We have not simply reached the end of the line with 
our economic system, but through our entire industrial civilization we have 
fallen into crisis, which will prove permanent if we are not ready to change 
course entirely.” The Greens called for a “gentle, non-violent, green repub-
lic” that did not aim its guns outward and inward; for Germany to leave 
nato; and for “a government that is prepared to have the Federal Republic 
go it alone on behalf of peace and disarmament.”32
In the mid 1980s, the Green party shared with the AfD of 2017 a penchant 
for populism and protest. It too had arisen in opposition to the “old parties,” 
which it deemed unresponsive to ecologists, feminists, and pacifists. After its 
electoral breakthrough in 1983, Petra Kelly, a prominent Green co-founder 
and member of parliament, declared “now the Bundestag will be occupied 
in order to fix it (instandbesetzt)” and that she wanted to pass along secret 
information to the party base because transparency was a core principle of 
her party.33 In parliament, the Greens, who spurned dress conventions and, 
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at times, parliamentary etiquette, stirred things up through acts of protest and 
with combative language. The Green party deputy Jürgen Reents derided 
Helmut Kohl’s path to cdu party chair and Bundestag caucus leader as hav-
ing been bought (freigekauft) by the Flick industrial concern. When the act-
ing Bundestag president proceeded to throw Reents out of the session and 
ban him for four days, Joschka Fischer interjected angrily, which resulted in 
his own two-day ban. Fischer countered: “With all due respect, Mr. Presi-
dent, you are an asshole.” “Nazis” yelled out some from the cdu/csu benches 
toward the Greens, an accusation that sat badly with the newcomers.34
pds
In the December 1990 federal election, the pds won 2.4 percent nationally, 
11.1 percent of the eastern vote and seventeen seats in parliament. As succes-
sor to the East German Communist party, the pds mostly drew its leaders and 
members from the sed. The pds’s internal factions ranged from social demo-
crats to reform socialists to a radical left wing, represented by the Communist 
Platform. In the 1990s, the party had ties to far-left antifascist Autonomists 
(“Black Bloc”) who regularly clashed with German police.35 Its pragmatic first 
two leaders, Gregor Gysi and Lothar Bisky, were dogged by allegations that 
they had been secret police informants in the German Democratic Republic 
(gdr). In its 1993 program, the pds struck a populist note pledging that “the 
pds will actively represent the interests of the people in eastern Germany vis-à-
vis the destructive tendency of a colonial annexation policy.”36 Like the early 
Greens, it too opposed German membership in nato. 
In the Bundestag, the pds irked the mainstream parties by attacking the 
process of German unification, representing the interests of the gdr’s fallen 
elite, and espousing strict pacifism. The party was not averse to displays 
of protest. In January 1991, Gysi spoke out against the Gulf War wearing 
a white arm band. Gysi and other leaders engaged in a week-long hunger 
strike in 1994 to oppose the taxation of pds property. With cheeky retorts 
during Bundestag debates, and publicity-grabbing stunts, the pds cultivated 
its image as “Gysi’s colorful corps.”37 It portrayed itself as an intrepid voice of 
the east that refused to be silenced by the western establishment.
In summary, the AfD, bhe, Greens, and pds were ideologically diverse 
parties, each containing relatively moderate as well as radical elements. They 
attacked the established parties and engaged in protest and populism. Yet 
important differences existed as well. The AfD is on the far right; the bhe was 
on the center-right; the Greens were on the center-left; and the pds on the far 
left. The AfD outraged with its anti-immigrant rhetoric, widely blamed for 
fueling a toxic atmosphere that emboldens rightwing terrorism, and with its 
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controversial policy proposals toward refugees, Muslims, and the European 
Union; the Green party on the basis of its radical policy prescriptions, its 
counterculture style and its members with far-left backgrounds; and the pds 
on its sed origins, its anticapitalism, its advocacy on behalf of former gdr 
elite, its qualified defense of East Germany and its links with hard left groups 
in society. In the Bundestag, the AfD lacked a dominant centrist leadership, 
while pragmatic reformers in the bhe, Greens, and pds soon led their respec-
tive parties. Whereas the AfD became more extreme after 2013 and the bhe 
more nationalist after 1955, the Greens and pds moderated their programs 
and eventually joined the establishment, dimming memories of when they 
too were depicted as a threat to liberal democracy.38 
Strategic Responses Toward Unwelcome Newcomers
In determining its response toward a new challenger, an established party 
has several options: ignore it, exclude it, contest its program and policies, 
cooperate with it, or incorporate parts of its agenda.39 To Bonnie M. Meguid, 
it can adopt a “dismissive strategy,” in which it ignores the niche party’s posi-
tion in order not to lend it credence in the eyes of the voters. It may alter-
natively pursue an “accommodative strategy,” in which it assumes a similar 
policy stance or an “adversarial strategy” in which it opposes the policy of 
the niche party.40 
William Downs codes responses toward contemporary pariah parties 
across two dimensions.41 On the one hand, an established democratic party 
may disengage or engage those with questionable democratic credentials. 
On the other hand,  it may pursue either a  strategy of  tolerance or one of 
militancy, that is banning or surveilling the party or curtailing its electoral 
activities. By combining tolerance and disengagement, the mainstream party 
ignores the pariah party. The coupling of militancy and disengagement leads 
it to ban or isolate it. The combination of engagement and militancy results 
in the democratic party adjusting its own policies in the hope of coopting 
the pariah party’s issues and attracting its supporters. Finally, by combining 
tolerance with engagement, it pursues some form of collaboration, whether 
cooperation on legislation or formal coalitions.42 
Stefan Rummens and Koen Abts recommended a dual strategy by which 
democratic parties exert pressure on an extreme party in an effort to civilize 
it, while adjusting their own policies in a way that addresses the extremist 
party voters’ concerns.43 As we shall see, the established parties have fol-
lowed this general recipe toward the AfD and the Greens.
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This article distinguishes between “supply-side” policies vis-à-vis the 
challenger in parliament and “demand-side” ones that target its voters and 
members. In the Bundestag, parties may adopt supply-side tactics that fit the 
broader strategy of what David Art has called “containment.”44 They may 
change formal rules or depart from established practices in an effort to limit 
the party’s presence in parliamentary bodies; they may refuse to support any 
proposal that it puts forth or refuse to co-sponsor joint resolutions; they may 
shout down, heckle or ignore its deputies in parliament; and they may call 
out the party as extremist or push back against its legislative initiatives in an 
effort to avoid normalizing the party, its language and its positions.
In contrast, demand-side policies seek to reduce societal support for the 
challenger party. For instance, established parties may copy its policy posi-
tions—in other words, steal its themes (Themenklau); they may educate voters 
as to why its policies are misguided; or they may ignore, silence, or stigma-
tize its proposed policies. Mainstream parties may also seek to undermine a 
challenger party by poaching its members and leaders, so that it has fewer, 
or by demonizing its members and leaders, so that fewer want to join or 
lead the party.
Comparative Responses in the Federal Republic
The established parties have marginalized the AfD in the Bundestag, much 
like they previously did vis-à-vis the Greens and the pds, but unlike how 
they treated the bhe, which was received as a normal democratic competitor. 
They have courted AfD voters by adjusting policy positions on refugees and 
the Euro, a strategy seen in the approach toward the bhe and Green voters in 
decades past, but less apparent vis-à-vis pds voters.
AfD: Parliamentary Exclusion and Issue Inclusion 
In 2017, the other Bundestag parties rejected the AfD as a potential coalition 
partner. In summer 2019, the cdu’s presidium and executive committee reaf-
firmed a 2018 party congress resolution that categorically ruled out coalitions 
or similar arrangements. The party leadership assured that the cdu would 
use all means at its disposal to enforce the resolution.45 At this time, Chris-
tian Social Union (csu) chair Markus Söder indicated that his party opposed 
any and all cooperation with the AfD, even “only chit-chat over coffee in 
a local assembly.”46 For its part, the AfD showed scant interest in joining a 
government or in building bridges to its competitors. Co-chair Frauke Petry 
had introduced a motion at the 2017 AfD party congress that proposed a 
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“realistic political path of a bourgeois people’s party” that could lead to the 
AfD’s participation in coalitions, and she contrasted this approach with the 
“fundamentalist-oppositional strategy,” which she attributed to Alexander 
Gauland, seeking to exert influence through external pressure. The party 
congress did not back her proposal.47 By September 2017, Petry had quit the 
party and Gauland had replaced her as federal co-chair. 
Generally, the other parties have refrained from revising Bundestag rules 
to keep AfD deputies out of committees, offices, or honorary positions. An 
exception occurred when shortly before the September 2017 national elec-
tion the Bundestag mandated that the longest serving deputy, rather than, 
as had long been the case, the oldest member of parliament, would deliver, 
as Alterspräsident, the opening address. This was done in order to prevent an 
AfD deputy, most likely Wilhelm von Gottberg, from having the honor of 
commencing the new legislative session.48 
The established parties have scuppered AfD candidates on occasion. 
Although each parliamentary caucus is entitled to a vice-president post in 
the Bundestag presidium, a successful candidate must receive a majority of 
the votes (currently 355) in a secret ballot. As of March 2020, four AfD 
candidates had fallen short in three rounds of voting, while a fifth had come 
up short in his first two attempts. This suggests that some deputies are prin-
cipally opposed to any AfD candidate joining a body that represents Ger-
many’s parliamentary democracy and, as such, exercises a state-supporting 
(staatstragende) function.
After the 2017 federal election, the Bundestag initially rejected Roman 
Reusch (AfD) from the Parliamentary Oversight Board (pkg), which moni-
tors the intelligence agencies, but then approved him later.49 Whereas a 
Bundestag party normally places its committee chairpersons without a vote, 
the AfD candidates were subject to votes. Nonetheless, its three candidates 
were approved, albeit with votes of “no” from the Left Party among others 
as well as numerous abstentions.50 In May 2018, Petr Bystron (AfD), who 
was under investigation from the Office of Constitutional Protection for ties 
to the extremist identitarian movement, failed to become the chair of the 
subcommittee on external cultural and education policy after receiving only 
one vote of support in a secret ballot.51 
Since 2017, the governing parties (cdu/csu and spd) and the other opposi-
tion parties (fdp, Left Party and Greens) have not cooperated with the AfD 
on legislation. Although all the parties had approved certain procedural 
motions, the cdu/csu, fdp, Left Party, and Greens have not introduced any 
substantive proposal with the AfD nor supported any of its proposals or leg-
islative initiatives. Moreover, they have sought to pass legislation that did 
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have or need the newcomer’s support.52 The Greens did back an AfD motion 
in a subcommittee in February 2018, but once this vote came to light they 
indicated that it would not happen again.53 As ideological “border parties” 
within the party system, the cdu and csu face a challenge when the AfD 
introduces a motion whose content resembles their own stated positions.54 
For instance, when the AfD proposed legislation on dual citizenship, which 
largely matched the cdu/csu’s position, the Christian Democrats, who are 
unwilling to work with the AfD, accounted for their “no” by pointing to the 
nationalistic language that the AfD used to support the motion.55
In the Bundestag, the established parties, especially those on the left, 
called out the AfD, accused it of racism, of using Nazi-like language, of his-
torical revisionism and of fostering a hate-laden climate that brings forth 
political violence. They heckled its speakers and challenged its democratic 
credentials. In its very first Bundestag appearance on 24 October 2017, the 
AfD’s protests regarding the Alterspräsident rule change were met with deri-
sion: “I am about to cry;” “Sophists!” and then a reference to the AfD’s 
familiarity with Hermann Göring’s methods.56 In November 2017, Christine 
Buchholz (die Linke) panned the AfD as “a racist, a nationalist and a milita-
ristic party,” to which Left Party deputies, many Greens and some Social 
Democrats clapped approval. Bundestag president Schäuble urged a more 
moderate tone and referred the matter to the Council of Elders (Ältestenrat). 
Schäuble, however, did not sanction Buchholz and left open the question as 
to whether the AfD could be called racist.57
In February 2018, Green party deputy Cem Özedemir pulled no punches 
in a Bundestag speech accusing the AfD of despising “this house as much 
as you despise the values of the Enlightenment.” He also said that the party 
reminded him of Nazi political agitation in the “Sportpalast.”58 Bundestag 
deputies accused the AfD of having a racial (völkisch) ideology, using Nazi 
language and spreading xenophobia. In September 2018, Martin Schulz (spd) 
linked the AfD to Nazi-methods and said Gauland “belongs in the dustbin 
of German history;” Johannes Kahrs (spd) called the AfD deputies rightwing 
extremist, brushed off a question from “rightwing radicals” and said to the 
AfD deputies “hate makes one ugly, look at yourself in the mirror.” The AfD 
then filed out.59 The Green party interrupted AfD speakers (Zwischenrufe) 
more than did any other with more than a third of its interventions directed 
at the party.60
The established parties have not treated the AfD as a normal democratic 
competitor. The fdp, for instance, unsuccessfully tried to avoid sitting next 
to it in the Bundestag. Whereas Bundestag vice-president Claudia Roth 
(Greens), herself a regular target of verbal abuse from the AfD, generally 
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thanked speakers upon the conclusion of their addresses she refrained from 
doing so for an AfD speaker. In a debate on an AfD motion, speakers took but 
one of the AfD’s five questions (Zwischenfragen).61 Although it is commonplace 
for members of one caucus to applaud those from another, the established 
parties hardly every clapped for an AfD speaker.62 Likewise, whereas in the 
Bundestag budget committee it has been the convention for members to use 
the informal “Du” amongst themselves, some have refused when addressing 
AfD deputies.63 Bundestag deputies, especially those on the left, are reluctant 
to greet those from the AfD whose paths they cross in parliament.64
The established Bundestag parties have cited the defense of democracy as 
a reason to give the AfD’s deputies a cold shoulder. In an October 2017 arti-
cle entitled “Against Normalization!,” Buchholz explained her caucus’ posi-
tion: “A categorical repudiation makes it possible to effectively enlighten the 
public regarding the AfD’s nature.”65 On the center-right, the cdu/csu Bund-
estag caucus refused to cooperate with the AfD because, according to former 
caucus chair Volker Kauder, “right-radical positions are openly represented 
in this party. Leading politicians and Bundestag deputies express themselves 
in this vein without hesitation. The party calls into question the legitimacy 
of the Bundestag and therefore subverts our democracy.”66 In a June 2019 
statement, the cdu rejected cooperation with the AfD on the grounds that it 
had contributed to the political climate in which a rightwing extremist mur-
dered Walter Lübke (cdu), a local politician in Hesse.67 In early July 2019, 
the cdu politician Friedrich Merz indicated that he supported the AfD having 
a Bundestag vice-president and favored a “less agitated” orientation toward 
AfD members and deputies. His party colleague Ruprecht Polenz tweeted: 
“To exclude the racial-nationalist AfD is not ‘agitated’ but necessary.”68
From the vantage point of the established parties, the AfD was taking away 
votes, parliamentary seats and resources. For these reasons, it would probably 
have met a chilly reception upon entering the Bundestag, even if it had had 
fewer controversial members or a less radical program. The AfD inflicted 
more electoral pain on some than others. It likely cost the fdp its place in 
parliament in 2013; in 2017, its strong showing left a cdu/csu-fdp coalition 
without a majority. By warning of cdu-AfD cooperation, the spd sought to 
put the cdu on the defensive and called upon the cdu to distance itself from 
a possible route to power in the eastern Länder. The cdu said it had done so 
and brusquely accused its coalition partner of defamation.69 
The established parties have not rewritten rules to exclude the AfD in part 
because it would portray itself as a victim to its many supporters (an eighth of 
all voters in 2017). The size of the AfD’s caucus also played a role; its eighty-
nine-plus seats in parliament and its position as the largest opposition party, 
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made it difficult to shut out from committees, commissions, or privileges with-
out abandoning the principle of proportionality or without also excluding the 
three smaller caucuses. 
On the demand side, the AfD’s opponents have adjusted their policy posi-
tions to varying degrees to reduce its electoral appeal. The cdu and csu, which 
lost more than a million votes to the AfD in 2017, have at times favored taking 
back policy ground ceded to the AfD in the hope of recovering lost support.70 
Chancellor Merkel has stood by her 2015 policies during the refugee crisis, 
but nonetheless, has made clear that the federal government views the influx 
in 2015 as exceptional. It has backed the European Union’s deal with Turkey 
to reduce the number of asylum-seekers reaching Europe. Kauder, the for-
mer chair of the cdu/csu Bundestag caucus, attributed AfD gains to divisions 
within the cdu/csu on the refugee issue and supported the Union’s efforts to 
attract AfD voters by toughening its policies: “Therefore it is important that 
we achieved, for example, in the coalition agreement the limiting of family 
reunification.”71 In summer 2018, the csu proposed turning back migrants at 
the border who may not be legally entitled to apply for refugee status. Analysts 
traced the csu’s hard line to the upcoming regional elections in Bavaria, in 
which the AfD was poised for strong gains. The csu used phrases that resem-
bled those of the AfD, such as “asylum tourism,” “Islam does not belong to 
Germany,” and the promise of a “conservative revolution.”
In the 2013 Bundestag election, the fdp had fallen just short of the 5 percent 
mark after many of its former voters backed the AfD. During the 2017 election 
campaign, the Liberals called for an eventual phasing out of the Eurozone sta-
bilization mechanism in its election manifesto, floated the possibility of easing 
sanctions on Russia, and maintained that Syrian refugees would be expected 
to return once conditions had improved in their former country. These posi-
tions led critics to describe the fdp’s campaign as “AfD light.”72 
Except for the Greens, the other leftwing parties debated amongst them-
selves whether to adjust their positions toward refugees at the risk of betray-
ing core values. The Left Party lost more than 400,000 voters to the AfD 
in 2017 and finished behind it in eastern Germany.73 As Left Party voters, 
many of them working class,  turned to the AfD, former party chair Oskar 
Lafontaine and the then Bundestag caucus co-chair, Wagenknecht, distanced 
themselves from the “open borders” plank in their party’s platform. By early 
2019, there were indications that the three left-of-center parties had chosen 
to deemphasize refugee policy, a politically difficult field for the spd and Left 
Party, in particular.74 
In addition to coopting the challenger party’s positions, established par-
ties can attempt to reduce demand for the newcomer by contributing to its 
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societal stigmatization, thereby making the party less attractive to potential 
members and leaders. They have called upon the Federal Office of Constitu-
tional Protection (BfV) to probe the AfD for antidemocratic tendencies. Such 
calls intensified after the racially motivated terrorist attacks in Hanau. Cur-
rently the BfV is not scrutinizing the AfD as a whole. In March 2020, how-
ever, the Wing was judged to be rightwing extremist, which allows the agency 
to use classical espionage methods such as secret service informers. If the 
AfD becomes an object of official BfV observation, then this could negatively 
affect federal civil servants (Beamte) in the AfD. This may have contributed to 
the recent decision of two former police officials (Lars Herr mann and Verena 
Hartmann) to leave the AfD and its Bundestag caucus. Other civil servants 
may be heading for the exits as well. Business owners and self-employed in 
the caucus have claimed, given the party’s stigma, that their political engage-
ment has cost them customers and clients.75
Established parties can also attempt to weaken a challenger party by 
siphoning off its members and leaders. That said, Germany’s major par-
ties have shown little inclination to accept former AfD politicians into their 
ranks. Of the five Bundestag deputies elected on the AfD ticket who either 
did not join or later left the AfD caucus because of the growing influence of 
the party’s far right, none has been included as part of another caucus. (Like-
wise, among the twelve AfD politicians who chose to leave their respec-
tive AfD Landtag caucuses between 2014 and late February 2017, only 
one became a member of an established party’s caucus (spd).76 In terms of 
accepting former AfD members, the fdp declared in 2015 that they were not 
welcome. The cdu in Thuringia also indicated that it did not want them. In 
March 2019, though, csu leader Söder called upon moderates to leave the 
AfD and come back.77
bhe: Parliamentary Inclusion and Issue Inclusion 
In the early 1950s, both the center-right parties and the leftwing Social Dem-
ocrats formed coalitions with the bhe at the regional level. Although Konrad 
Adenauer (cdu) did not need the bhe to remain chancellor in 1953, he did 
require its votes for the two-thirds majority in parliament needed to amend 
the constitution to conform with the General Treaty and rearmament. More-
over, by bringing the bhe into a “bourgeois bloc,” he further served to isolate 
the spd as the lone opposition party in the Bundestag. In return, the bhe 
received two cabinet seats (Oberländer became expellee affairs minister and 
Kraft a minister without portfolio) as well as state secretary posts and numer-
ous lower level government offices, especially in the expellee ministry. In 
exchange, it accepted Adenauer’s foreign policy course.78 
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With the bhe’s rise, the established Bundestag parties tended to the needs of 
the expellees in an effort to counter the new party. As Franz Neumann notes, 
“the parties that were already represented in the Bundestag activated their own 
expellee politics. As a result, the position of expellee deputies in those par-
ties was enhanced and expellee politicians were sought after contacts (gefragte 
Gesprächspartner.)”79 With input from the bhe, the governing parties passed 
the Equalization of Burdens Act (1952) and the Federal Expellee Law (1953), 
which lessened expellee hardship and advanced integration. Linus Kather, a 
cdu politician and expellee leader who played a key role in the Equalization of 
Burdens law, wrung key concessions from Adenauer who was concerned that 
Kather and other expellee deputies would leave the party for the bhe.80 
To undercut support for the newcomer party, Chancellor Adenauer and 
the cdu/csu actively courted its members, leaders, and voters. In 1955, Kraft 
and Oberländer, the two bhe federal ministers, broke with their party over 
the federal government’s Saar policy, remained in the cabinet, and later 
joined the cdu. At this time, five additional deputies left the bhe for the cdu 
caucus, while two others sat with the fdp.81 The rump bhe caucus entered the 
opposition. In 1957, the party received under 5 percent of the national vote 
and left the Bundestag, never to return. Its competitors, especially the cdu/
csu, absorbed many of its voters, members and leaders, while a minority 
drifted off to far-right parties.
Greens: Parliamentary Exclusion and Issue Inclusion 
In the 1980s, the mainstream parties kept the Greens at arm’s length, 
excluding and isolating the new challenger party, which had the small-
est of the four Bundestag delegations. In late 1983, the governing cdu/
csu and fdp passed the federal budget. For decades, a budget subcommit-
tee had approved funds for the intelligence agencies. In order to keep out 
the Greens, who were cast as a security risk, the Bundestag approved a 
new parliamentary control board (pkg) that would take the place of the 
subcommittee. It was, however, not constituted until after the budget had 
already passed, thereby ensuring that the Greens had no part in the deci-
sion-making. The Greens appealed to the Federal Constitutional Court, 
which recognized the Greens’ concern, but did not require that the budget 
be passed according to previous procedures.82 The Bundestag did not seat 
a Green in the newly constituted pkg. In early 1984, it was decided that this 
new body would have only five members: two from the cdu/csu, two from 
the spd, and one from the fdp.83 By limiting the board’s size, they could 
eliminate the Greens while maintaining the principle of proportionality. 
Tellingly, when the Bundestag debated the board’s creation, an fdp deputy 
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differentiated between parties that were representing the interests of the 
state (staatstragend) and those that were not, with the clear implication being 
that the Greens belonged to the latter.84
The federal parliament opted not to award the Greens a vice-presidency 
post in 1983 or 1987. Only in 1994 was the rule established that each full-
fledged caucus (Fraktion) would have a place in the presidium, although the 
candidate must be voted in. In their first Bundestag debate, the Greens com-
plained that they were being unfairly excluded from the presidium, that they 
should have a basic right to be represented in all committees and boards, and 
that their work conditions were unsatisfactory. They encountered derisive 
laughter, repeated interruptions, and insults.85 By way of fierce heckling, the 
established parties, in particular, the Christian Democrats, conveyed their 
conviction that the Greens did not belong in parliament.86
Why did the established parties isolate and exclude the Greens in par-
liament? In the mid 1980s, the cdu/csu Bundestag caucus portrayed them 
as leftwing extremist, as being like Nazis, and as enemies of constitutional 
democracy.87  In  an  analysis  entitled  “On Route  to  a Green Dictatorship,” 
Ottfried Hennig (cdu) predicted that “a green state cannot and will not in the 
end be a democracy. It will be a state that starts with the ‘English disease’ and 
ends as a state of Green mullahs and ecological ayatollahs.”88 Rudolf Seiters 
(cdu) and Wolfgang Bötsch (csu), as parliamentary whips, released a study 
in 1986 purporting that leftwing Greens were using the topic of environ-
mental protection as an excuse to achieve Germany’s “subjugation to Soviet 
hegemony.”89 In early 1987, the cdu/csu Bundestag faction released a report 
claiming that elements within the Greens tolerated political violence and 
held sympathy for terrorism.90 This accusation would resurface decades later 
as a reason to isolate the AfD.
By attacking the Greens, the cdu/csu also put pressure on the spd, a bor-
der party. Prior to the collapse of the spd-fdp coalition in 1982, the cdu had 
shown restraint toward the Greens who were challenging the spd-led govern-
ment. After 1983, however, when the Greens became a potential coalition 
option for the spd, the cdu increasingly focused on their supposed extremism 
and the perils of a Red-Green coalition.91 This put the national spd on the 
defensive, especially once its Hesse branch joined forces with the Greens in 
1985 in the first regional Red-Green government. In 1986, Geißler warned of 
“Red-Green chaos,” described the Greens as “fascistoid,” as the spd’s “politi-
cal Volkssturm,” and as “party chair Willy Brandt’s joker up the sleeve to gain 
office through voter deception and trickery.”92
The established parties sidelined the Green party in the hope that it was 
a passing phenomenon. It arose as Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and the spd 
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had tacked to the center on economic and security policy. When Helmut 
Kohl replaced Schmidt as chancellor, it was reasonable to expect the Social 
Democrats to shift leftward and reabsorb those who had gone over to the 
Greens. Kohl predicted the Green party caucus’ demise: “I give them two 
years, then they will cross over one by one to the spd.”93 On  the Greens’ 
first day in the Bundestag, Bötsch warned; “ladies and gentlemen from the 
Greens, the page on which you are writing history will possibly be part of a 
loose-leaf collection. This is what we hope anyway. With our policy we will 
have a hand in making it so.”94
At the time the mainstream parties were marginalizing the Green party 
in parliament, they were elevating environmentalism within their own 
platforms in an effort to undercut the challenger’s electoral appeal. Fol-
lowing the Chernobyl nuclear disaster and in light of the Greens’ ascent, 
the Kohl government established the Federal Environmental Ministry. 
Heiner Geißler, cdu general secretary, later claimed that this had ensured 
a center-right victory in the 1986 Lower Saxony elections.95 Since the 
mid 1980s, the spd politician Lafontaine pressed his party to adjust its 
environmental and foreign policy positions in an effort to recover votes 
from the Greens.96 In late 1989, the spd passed a new party program that 
called for ecological renewal, sounding themes that the Greens had helped 
introduce.97 As the spd chancellor candidate, Lafontaine had intended to 
make this a dominant campaign topic in the upcoming federal election. 
Although the spd lost in December 1990, it did take votes from the West 
German Greens, contributing to their failure to reach 5 percent in the west 
and rejoin the Bundestag.
pds: Parliamentary Exclusion and Issue Exclusion 
The pds fought a lonely battle upon entering the Bundestag in 1990. Because 
it had not received 5 percent of the second ballot vote, the other parties 
assigned it group rather than caucus status. This status, which was shared by 
the eastern German Alliance ‘90/Greens group from 1990–1994, resulted 
in significantly fewer parliamentary rights and much less money. The pds 
fought the decision in the Federal Constitutional Court where it met with 
limited success, although it did acquire the right to be included on subcom-
mittees. The court also ruled that parliament could choose the mathematical 
formula to allot seats proportionally, allowing the Bundestag to reduce the 
pds’s presence in committees and boards by applying the d’Hondt method in 
place of the previously commonplace Schepers method, while upholding the 
proportionality principle.98 The court in a 4:4 decision, however, permitted 
the Bundestag to suspend the principality of proportionality by excluding 
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the pds from the Common Committee (Gemeinsamer Ausschuss), which in 
an emergency acted in place of the parliament.99 The Bundestag also kept 
the pds out of the Bundestag presidium, the pkg, the committee that names 
judges (Richterauswahlausschuss), the G10 commission and the conference 
committee between Bundestag and Bundesrat.100 Although the pds group had 
five minutes of floor time per every hour of debate, the Bundestag Ältestenrat, 
a body in which the pds group did not have full membership rights, limited 
the length of Gregor Gysi’s speeches from twenty to ten minutes.101 Gysi was 
the party’s most popular orator.
In 1994 federal election, Stefan Heym, an eighty-one-year old eastern 
German novelist and pds-backed candidate won an eastern Berlin election 
district. As the oldest Bundestag member, he gave the opening Alterspräsident 
speech.102 Rather than change the rules to exclude him, as would be done 
twenty-three years later to hinder an AfD speaker, Chancellor Kohl and his 
cdu/csu party colleagues instead chose to stare woodenly ahead during the 
speech, stay seated throughout, and to refrain from any applause. Later, the 
federal press office did not print Heym’s speech in its publication Bulletin, 
as was customary, with the Kohl government’s spokesperson, Dieter Vogel, 
explaining that he saw “no reason on top of that to convey the remarks of the 
representative of a party that stands in diametrical opposition to our demo-
cratic views.”103 The Bundestag opposition parties, as well as the governing 
fdp, complained about the decision not to publish. Nearly six months later, 
the speech finally appeared in Bulletin.104
In the 1990s, the established Bundestag parties kept their pds contacts to 
a minimum, refusing to support pds-backed legislation, even if it was uncon-
troversial. Rather, they would put forth their own draft and not include the 
pds as a co-sponsor.105 In 1992, Dagmar Enkelmann, a pds Bundestag dep-
uty, bemoaned that “everything is done so that our motions do not make 
it through committee. We would not be able to carry the motion ‘Kohl is 
chancellor.’”106 The other parties also regularly interrupted and heckled pds 
speakers. In 1991, Der Spiegel wrote:
good manners are suspended whenever a deputy from the pds comes to 
the podium in the Bundestag. Parliamentarians from all the other cau-
cuses unabashedly slide their chairs across the floor, rustle their newspa-
pers and talk loudly with one another as if there were no speech from 
the pds. This is exactly the point to it all. It is to make clear to the parlia-
mentarian outcasts from the sed successor party that their presence is not 
valued at all. The newcomers complain that the only ones who listen to 
them are the “notorious hecklers.”107
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Given its small size and political isolation, the pds had limited influence 
over Bundestag scheduling, which made it easier for others to ignore it. The 
party complained in early 1998 that its business had ended the day on forty-
six of fifty Bundestag sessions. Television coverage had wrapped up and most 
had gone home for the evening.108
After German unification, the established parties, led by the cdu/csu, 
marginalized the pds in parliament on account of its origins, its anticapitalist 
program, its far left wing and its defense of fallen gdr elites. Electoral con-
siderations played a part as well. The cdu hoped to dissuade anticommunist 
western Germans from backing the spd while making it costly for the spd 
to govern with the pds in the east. In 1994, it cautioned voters that the spd 
was preparing to join forces with the pds. On  its posters,  it warned: “Into 
the Future … But not with red socks on.” A further reason to exclude the 
pds was that it was thought that the party had no political future in unified 
Germany. Its eastern support had declined from 16.4 percent in the March 
1990 East German election to 11.1 percent in the December 1990 federal 
election; its membership had fallen dramatically, and its calls for socialism 
and its defense of the gdr were out of step with the times. Most assumed the 
east-west cleavage, with the passage of time, would lose salience, thereby 
depriving the pds of fertile ground to operate as the “authentic” voice of the 
east. Unlike the much larger AfD in 2017, the pds could be marginalized and 
ignored in parliament by adjusting the proportionality formula or saddling it 
with an unfavorable Bundestag schedule. 
In terms of demand-side responses, the established parties, whose lead-
ers, members, and voters were overwhelmingly western German, generally 
showed little interest in copying the pds’s positions although they did attempt 
to be more responsive to eastern German needs.109 The pds portrayed its own 
exclusion as part and parcel of the western establishment’s alleged marginal-
ization of eastern interests, biographies and identity.
Whereas in the 1950s the mainstream parties had courted bhe leaders and 
members, they kept former sed members at arm’s length. In January 1990, the 
executive committee of the East German spd passed a resolution with restric-
tions on former sed members joining the party. This sent a clear signal and 
left many former members of the once 2.3 million-member strong party with 
no place to turn but the pds if they wanted to pursue political careers in uni-
fied Germany. For its part, the cdu, as the former East German prime minis-
ter Lothar de Maiziére (cdu) acknowledged, was tougher toward former sed 
members than it had been toward former National Socialists.110 
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Conclusion
Upon entering the Bundestag, the AfD in 2017, the bhe in 1953, the Greens 
in 1983 and the pds in 1990 each presented the mainstream parties with chal-
lenges. They raised new issues that had received less attention; they attacked 
the so-called old parties for neglecting the interests of the people; they fea-
tured relatively moderate and more radical elements within their ranks; and 
they defied obvious classification as extremist. In the three most recent cases, 
the newcomers engaged in populism and protest to counter the policies and 
values of the establishment.
Although the AfD’s 2017 breakthrough may mark a turning point in the 
German party system, its treatment in parliament has not stood out as excep-
tional. Instead, in its basic contours, it mirrors how the Greens and the pds 
were received. All three were deemed to be unrepresentative of the interests 
of the state; all were ruled out as federal coalition partners; all were kept out 
of the Bundestag presidium; all were isolated in terms of their legislative 
initiatives; and all three were alternatively heckled, called out, or ignored in 
parliament. Those parties furthest removed ideologically from the respec-
tive newcomer, whether the leftwing parties after 2017 or the cdu/csu in the 
1980s and 1990s, confronted the upstart most vigorously. The exceptional 
case was in the 1950s when the established parties cooperated with the new-
comer bhe from the outset. 
Across the four cases, parties adjusted their policies in order to diminish 
the challenger’s electoral appeal. After the AfD’s rise, some toughened their 
rhetoric regarding refugees and to a lesser extent the Euro in the hope of 
taking the wind out of the AfD’s electoral sails. This was most apparent with 
the csu in 2018, but also evident with the fdp and cdu. When the bhe arose, 
others competed with it by empowering their own expellee politicians and 
through laws that benefited expellees. Following the Greens’ breakthrough, 
the cdu/csu, fdp and spd developed environmental planks in their party pro-
grams and, led by the spd, gave greater emphasis to Green party themes. In 
contrast, in the 1990s the established parties showed little interest in adopting 
pds positions critical of unification or in meaningfully enhancing eastern Ger-
man descriptive representation. 
As shown in Table 1, the established parties have responded to the AfD 
with a combination of parliamentary exclusion and the partial inclusion of 
its themes. This strategy, which resembles that followed toward the Greens 
in the 1980s, corresponds with the recommendation of Rummens and Abts, 
who, as earlier discussed, advised limited repression by way of direct pressure 
on the extreme party in order to tame it and the crafting of policy positions 
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that met the concerns of the extreme party’s voters. Supply-side exclusion 
with demand-side inclusion did not eliminate the Greens nor make them 
redundant, but it arguably strengthened Green reformers. It remains to be 
seen whether attempts to marginalize the AfD, while at the same time adjust-
ing positions on immigration, will neutralize or tame the party. Perhaps the 
AfD’s more moderate faction will curb the extremists’ influence in an effort 
to head off an official observation by the Office of Constitutional Protection. 
So far, however, there has been little evidence of moderation as the party has 
moved further to the right.
Finally, a set of similar objectives shaped the established parties’ responses. 
In the three instances of parliamentary exclusion, they cited the need to pro-
tect democracy from extremists. In each case, those parties ideologically fur-
thest removed from the newcomer put pressure on a mainstream competitor 
by claiming or insinuating that it would cooperate with the outsider. For 
instance, the spd has challenged the cdu/csu to distance itself more clearly 
from the AfD. In the 1980s and 1990s, the cdu/csu attacked the spd for alleg-
edly planning to come to power first with the Greens and then later with the 
pds. In comparison, Adenauer isolated the spd in the Bundestag by including 
the bhe in federal government in 1953. 
The newcomer’s size influenced its treatment in parliament. The small 
Green caucus and the small pds group were more easily sidelined than the 
much larger AfD. Given its relatively large size and its provocative rhetoric, 
the AfD’s Bundestag caucus has instead experienced repeated and aggressive 
“calling out” during parliamentary debates, with a “one against all; all against 
one” dynamic being more apparent than in the 1980s and 1990s.
In short, there is no single response toward a challenger party and, as this 
study has shown, a one-size-fits-all policy has not been followed nor can it 
be followed. Whatever the strategy, it has involved trade-offs. For instance, 
Table 1: Supply-Side and Demand-Side Responses to New Challenger Parties
 Supply Side:
 Inclusion of the challenger party in parliament
 Less More
Demand Side: Less pds
Inclusion of the  
challenger party’s More Greens; AfD bhe
themes  
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although the early embrace of the bhe and its themes reduced the party’s 
ability to establish itself as a populist voice among expellees, it came at a 
cost: the increased presence of ex-Nazi functionaries in West German poli-
tics. Efforts to marginalize the Greens and the pds may have contributed to 
their taming, but, as of yet, this has not moderated the AfD. The Bundestag 
parties are of course not the only relevant players. Prior to better Bundestag 
relations with the bhe, the Greens, and the pds (and its successor the Left 
Party), the established parties at the regional level cracked the firewall by 
including each as a coalition partner. The February 2020 election of Thomas 
Kemmerich (fdp) as the minister-president in Thuringia, only made possible 
with the votes of Höcke and the AfD, at first suggested a growing reluctance 
among the established parties in the Länder, especially in the east where the 
AfD is strongest, to continue to isolate the newcomer. The national outrage 
that followed Kemmerich’s ascent, however, resulting in his resignation, has 
shown that the established national parties are still strongly against any coop-
eration with the Alternative for Germany.
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